The development of the mathematical theory of computability was motivated in large part by the foundational crisis in mathematics. D. Hilbert suggested an antidote to all the foundational problems that were discovered in the late 19th century: his proposal, in essence, was to formalize mathematics and construct a finite set of axioms that are strong enough to prove all proper theorems, but no more. Thus a proof of consistency and a proof of completeness were required. These proofs should be carried only by strictly finitary means so as to be beyond any reasonable criticism. As Hilbert pointed out [19] , to carry out this project one needs to develop a better understanding of proofs as objects of mathematical discourse:
Computation and Physics
The development of the mathematical theory of computability was motivated in large part by the foundational crisis in mathematics. D. Hilbert suggested an antidote to all the foundational problems that were discovered in the late 19th century: his proposal, in essence, was to formalize mathematics and construct a finite set of axioms that are strong enough to prove all proper theorems, but no more. Thus a proof of consistency and a proof of completeness were required. These proofs should be carried only by strictly finitary means so as to be beyond any reasonable criticism. As Hilbert pointed out [19] , to carry out this project one needs to develop a better understanding of proofs as objects of mathematical discourse:
To reach our goal, we must make the proofs as such the object of our investigation; we are thus compelled to a sort of proof theory which studies operations with the proofs themselves.
Furthermore, Hilbert hoped to find a single, mechanical procedure that would, at least in principle, provide correct answers to all well-defined questions in mathematics [20] :
The Entscheidungsproblem is solved when one knows a procedure by which one can decide in a finite number of operations whether a given logical expression is generally valid or is satisfiable. The solution of the Entscheidungsproblem is of fundamental importance for the theory of all fields, the theorems of which are at all capable of logical development from finitely many axioms.
Initially encouraging progress was made towards the realization of Hilbert's dream: first propositional logic was shown to be complete by Hilbert's student Ackermann, see [20] , then predicate logic by Gödel [14] . Predicate logic appeared to be the right framework for Hilbert's project since it conformed nicely to his ideas about mathematical existence: unless the assumption of existence produces an inconsistency, the alleged object indeed exists. Alas, in his seminal 1931 paper [15] , Gödel showed that logical completeness does not translate into mathematical completeness. Specifically, any attempt to formalize even just elementary arithmetic is already doomed to fail in the sense that, no matter how carefully the system is constructed, there will always be unprovable yet true statements (assuming, of course, the system is indeed consistent). This result is central to proof theory, but we can also interpret it computationally. In a formal system of the type Gödel considered, proofs are perfectly finitary objects and can be generated in a purely mechanical fashion without any particular insight into their meaning. In a certain sense, producing proofs is just a problem of word processing. As a consequence, the collection of provable theorems is semidecidable: there is a semi-algorithm that halts and reports "yes" if that is indeed the correct answer; otherwise it fails to halt. On the other hand, the collection of true statements of arithmetic is not even located within the arithmetic hierarchy, see [33] . The Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable for arithmetic, and, as we now know, for many other areas of mathematics such as group theory, lattice theory or the theory of the rationals. Gödel was very clear about the importance of computability in this context [16] :
Thus the notion "computable" is in a certain sense "absolute," while almost all metamathematical notions otherwise known (for example, provable, definable, and so on) quite essentially depend upon the system adopted.
The question as to how precisely the notion of computability itself should be formalized was finally solved to Gödel's satisfaction by Turing's groundbreaking paper [47] . It is noteworthy that Gödel initially resisted attempts to declare either the Gödel-Herbrand or the Church approach as the canonically correct solution.
Just a few years after Gödel's discovery, Alan Turing and John von Neumann both made critical contributions to an entirely new development: the construction of powerful and practical computers, machines that could actually carry out computations that had thus far been limited to purely theoret-ical discourse. In particular Turing's abstract idea of a universal computer, a device that can perform all possible computations whatsoever, turned out to be technologically realizable. The reason for this, in the most abstract sense, is the fact that physics supports computation: we can build concrete devices whose behavior is described by the laws of physics that implement Turing machines in a very obvious fashion. For reasons of efficiency, one usually employs a model referred to as a random access machine, but it is easy to see that these devices are very closely related to Turing machines in computational power (at least if one is willing to accept a polynomial slow-down). Thus, for any area of mathematics for which the Entscheidungsproblem does have a solution, we can build a physical device that will answer all questions put to it. For example, if we limit arithmetic to just addition, there is a decision algorithm for all sentences in this weak system as shown by Presburger [32] . Indeed, the algorithm has found practical use in model checking and helps to verify the correctness of certain computer programs [4] . On the other hand, any realization of the decision algorithm is also plagued by a lower bound result due to Fischer and Rabin that shows that it is necessarily doubly exponential in the worst case [10] . This connection between computation and physics may seem merely a matter of pragmatism; having the ability to perform large and complicated computations on actual and concrete physical devices is obviously a great advantage for mathematics. Some physicists would push a bit further, though, as in the following comment attributed to D. Deutsch:
The theory of computation has traditionally been studied almost entirely in the abstract, as a topic in pure mathematics. This is to miss the point of it. Computers are physical objects, and computations are physical processes. What computers can or cannot compute is determined by the laws of physics alone, and not by pure mathematics.
The same point is made more forcefully in [9, Chap. 8]:
So, contrary to what Hilbert thought, and contrary to what most mathematicians since antiquity have believed and believe to this day, proof theory can never be made into a branch of mathematics. Proof theory is a science: specifically, it is computer science.
No doubt these assertions will prove to be quite contentious in many quarters. At any rate, note the reference to computations as physical processes, a notion we will return to shortly. There is general agreement that the limitations of the physical universe that we occupy in terms of space, time, mass and energy impose limitations on what computations can be carried out in actuality, see [27] for a lucid discussion of these issues. However, these obstructions are not of a logical nature: given enough space, time, mass and energy any convergent computation in the sense of classical computability theory can be physically realized, using only bounded resources. Naturally the question arises whether any type of physically realizable process could correspond to a computation outside of this framework. In other words, could a physical process break through the Turing barrier or is there a physical version of the Church-Turing thesis that rules out the existence of any such process. In order to give a truly satisfactory answer to this question, one would first have to resolve Hilbert's 6th problem in a strong form and axiomatize physics, in its totality. At present there seems little hope for any such formalization of physics, all one can manage is a discussion of the computational implications of some particular physical theory such as Newtonian mechanics, general relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum field theory and so on. It is of course of interest to study the strength of physical theories such as Newtonian mechanics, even if they are known not to be in total agreement with actual physical reality [3] . However, the ultimate question of physical realizability will require a stronger approach.
It is interesting that Landauer [25] suggested that physical theories should be constrained so as to avoid collision with computational possibilities:
The calculative process, just like the measurement process, is subject to some limitations. Any sensible theory of physics must respect these limitations and should not invoke calculative routines that in fact cannot be carried out.
Of course, this restriction is only feasible if the mathematical support structure required for the theory of physics does not involve elements of noncomputability, an assertion that is not much different from a strong version of the Church-Turing thesis. Disregarding Landauer's exhortation, it is possible to select some particular theory of physics, such as relativity theory, and propose the construction of devices that could "solve" computationally unsolvable problems if the laws in that particular theory were in fact a complete description of physical reality. However, it is far from clear that a complete or nearly complete theory would afford such opportunities, see [8] for a more careful discussion.
We are here interested in the reverse problem: is it possible, in the context of physical computation, to break through the Turing barrier in the downward direction? The background for this question is a celebrated result in the theory of computation: there are semidecidable sets that are neither decidable nor as complicated as the Halting problem, the most complicated semidecidable set. These sets are said to be intermediate or of intermediate degree, a degree being a collection of all sets of the same level of complexity. The question of whether such sets exist is commonly referred to as Post's problem and its solution required the invention of a new proof technique, the so-called priority method, which has since become one of the hallmarks of computability theory, see [40] for a slightly dated but excellent overview or [1] for a more recent account. Somewhat surprisingly, the method was discovered independently and almost simultaneously on different continents by Friedberg and Muchnik, see [12, 29] . Priority arguments tend to be somewhat complicated and their massive use has led to some pointed criticism by Hao Wang [48] :
The study of degrees [of unsolvability] seems to be appealing only to some special kind of temperament since the results seem to go into many different directions. Methods of proof are emphasized to the extent that the main interest in this area is said to be not so much the conclusions proved as the elaborate methods of proof.
In particular with respect to the construction of sets of intermediate degrees, the corresponding priority argument undoubtedly produces the required set, but is disappointing in the sense that the set so constructed is entirely ad hoc, it has no qualities other than to provide a solution to Post's problem. By contrast, many sets of full degree such as the Halting problem or the set of solvable Diophantine equations are entirely natural; likewise, at the other end of the complexity spectrum, there are lots of examples of complicated yet decidable sets. This was perhaps stated most clearly by Davis [7] :
But one can be quite precise in stating that no one has produced an intermediate recursively enumerable degree about which it can be said that it is the degree of a decision problem that had been previously studied and named.
More recently, Ambos-Spies and Fejer in [1] are no less blunt in their complaint about the lack of natural intermediate problems:
The sets constructed by the priority method to solve Post's Problem have as their only purpose to be a solution. . . . Thus it can be said that the great complexity in the structure of the computably enumerable degrees arises solely from studying unnatural problems.
It seems pertinent to ask how intermediate degrees fare in the context of physics-like models of computation: is there a physical theory that allows for the construction of intermediate sets? In a certain literal sense, the answer would be "yes" since, in the context of any reasonable physical theory, one can construct a Turing machine that performs the priority construction and writes the elements of the intermediate set on some kind of recording device such as on output tape. For example, some version of this construction could certainly be handled in Newtonian mechanics. However, there is a sense in which this construction fails: an independent observer, with very modest computational means, could monitor the construction and produce a complete semidecidable set from the data so obtained. As it turns out, the intermediate set is obtained by hiding a significant part of the computational process that produces it; if one considers the process as a whole it is difficult to see how it could be considered to be intermediate in nature. Following this line of reasoning, Wolfram made a radical proposal in [51] , his so-called Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE)
There are various ways to state the Principle of Computational Equivalence, but probably the most general is just to say that almost all processes that are not obviously simple can be viewed as computations of equivalent sophistication . . . PCE . . . has vastly richer implications than the laws of thermodynamics or, for that matter, than essentially any single collection of laws in science.
No clear definition of a "process" is given in the reference, nor is there an explanation of what "equivalent sophistication" means technically, but since there are processes corresponding to complete semidecidable sets we can translate this into the claim that just two classes of processes can be distinguished: the decidable ones and the complete ones. Given this interpretation, it is safe to say that PCE rules out the existence of intermediate sets, at least in the context of any reasonable physical theory. As Cook's example of the universality proof for elementary cellular automaton number 110 has shown [5, 51] , it can be exceedingly difficult to determine the universality of a system that is given rather than being carefully and purposefully constructed. On the other hand, finding algorithms can also be a daunting task; for example, Presburger's method is by no means obvious. Thus it will be challenging to adduce evidence towards Wolfram's PCE. Note, though, Deutsch's notion of a jump to universality [9] , the observation that some systems undergo a phase transition that propels them from a fairly limited functionality to a much broader, maximal realm of applicability. For example, the early Roman system of numerals degenerated into a tallying system for sufficiently large numbers. The introduction of (the misnamed) Arabic numerals provided a numeration system that is universal in the sense that numbers of all sizes can be named without tallying and elementary arithmetic operations on these numbers are supported, regardless of size. If jumps to universality are the rule rather than the exception, then some version of PCE might indeed obtain.
Cellular Automata
As pointed out in the last section, priority arguments often lead to significant technical complications and are hard to check for correctness. This led Lerman [26] to introduce an intuitively appealing interpretation of the priority technique in terms of "pinball machines." In these machines, balls labeled by natural numbers roll down a track on an inclined plane, their movement guided by gates. A ball falling into a basket means that the corresponding number has entered a certain set. The gates are controlled by Turing machines and may restrain a ball from rolling further down the track. Thus Lerman's machines make a direct appeal to our intuitive understanding of mechanics in order to explain an otherwise complicated technical argument. Of course, significant effort would be necessary to implement these machines entirely within the confines of of Newtonian mechanics, but the basic idea is not too difficult. The power of computation based on Newtonian physics was shown conclusively in [3] : every subset of the natural numbers can be represented by some 3-dimensional Newtonian system. Importantly, the system constructed in the reference is bounded in space, time, mass and energy.
For our purposes, we prefer a setting that is further removed from physics but has a simple computational structure. Perhaps the most far-reaching proposal for such a framework are Gandy machines. In [13] , Gandy formulates four fundamental principles that describe a very general model of parallel computation, see also [37, 38] . Clearly, massive parallelism is an in-dispensable requirement for any physics-like model of computation. Gandy's ingenious model is based on hereditarily finite sets over a countable set of indistinguishable urelements. This admits an interpretation where the urelements are similarly indistinguishable physical components such as atoms or other particles. These components interact in certain patterns prescribed by the machine. Gandy proposes a "Thesis M": any computation by any kind of machine can already be carried out by a Turing machine. In support of this assertion, the reference contains a long list of counterexamples that demonstrate that the conditions proposed there cannot be relaxed without leading to devices that can compute any number theoretic function, an ability referred to as "displaying free will."
To avoid the significant technical difficulties of Gandy's approach, we will stay closer to models of physics embraced by Zuse, Fredkin and Wolfram [52, 11, 51] : cellular automata. A one-dimensional cellular automaton can be viewed as a continuous, shift-invariant map G : C → C that operates on the space of configurations C = Σ Z , consisting of all bi-infinite sequences over a finite alphabet Σ. The map G is the so-called global map of the automaton, see [49, 50, 21] . It is easy to see that G has a finitary description g : Σ w → Σ , the local map of the automaton. In essence, G is obtained by applying g simultaneously and in parallel to all overlapping blocks of length w in the given configuration. To compute the image G(X) of a given configuration X it suffices to apply a finite state transducer, operating on bi-infinite words, see [35, 31] . Transducers are arguably the most basic computational devices operating on inputs of arbitrary size, so there is no extra computational power hidden in the basic update step of the system. The compact Hausdorff space C has good properties in the sense of classical dynamics, but it is less pleasing from the perspective of computation since it contains uncountably many, non-finitary objects. In order to avoid complication with generalizations of classical computability theory, it is advantageous to consider a subspace, the collection of almost periodic configurations. These are configurations of the form ω uwv ω = . . . uuuwvvv . . . where u, w and v are all finite words. We write C ap for the collection of all almost periodic configurations. In the case where u = v and w = ε is empty we obtain the standard spatially periodic configurations, corresponding to finite cellular automata with periodic boundary conditions. In the case u = v = 0, where 0 is a specially chosen symbol of the alphabet, we obtain configurations of finite support, often referred to misleadingly as finite configurations in the literature. Clearly, almost periodic configurations have a natural fi-nite description. Note that Cook's argument establishing the universality of elementary cellular automaton number 110 requires C ap rather than just configurations of finite support, on the latter this automaton has only trivially decidable orbits.
To see why this choice is natural, consider the first-order structure A = C, G where, for merely technical reasons, G is interpreted as a binary relation: G(x, y) holds iff G(x) = y. We refer to A as the phasespace of the corresponding cellular automaton. A has a countable substructure A ap = C ap , G . As it turns out, the restriction A ap is an elementary substructure of A: exactly the same first-order sentences hold over both structures. It follows that the short-term evolution of configurations in A is indistinguishable from that in A ap . Properties such as "is reversible," "has a 5-cycle" or "is 2-to-1" can all be expressed in first-order logic as can be descriptions of general finite regions of phasespace. Moreover, A is an automatic structure in the sense of [23, 24] . Consequently, the Entscheidungsproblem for A is solvable: there is an algorithm that, given any first-order sentence, determines whether the sentence holds over A. Moreover, the decision algorithm is based entirely on automata-theoretic methods and is quite natural. This shows in particular that various basic properties of phasespace that can be expressed in first-order logic are all decidable. For example, one can test whether the automaton is reversible or whether the global map is surjective. Unsurprisingly, the algorithms obtained by a brute-force application of the general decision algorithm for A are not necessarily particularly efficient but, with a little bit of effort, one can derive fast quadratic time algorithms for the basic properties injectivity, openness and surjectivity of the global map, see [44, 45] . Our restriction to one-dimensional cellular automata is critical here, the first-order theory of two or higher dimensional automata is undecidable in general.
Questions about the long-term evolution of configurations, on the other hand, more often than not result in undecidability. The most basic of these questions is Reachability: given two configurations X and Y , does Y appear in the orbit of X? In our setting this problem is trivially semidecidable but clearly undecidable for some cellular automata: one can easily simulate a Turing machine by a cellular automaton. More complicated questions about the structure of orbits are also undecidable. For example, it is undecidable whether all configurations in C ap evolve to a limit cycle, in fact, the question is Π 0 2 -complete. The question whether the orbit of a configuration is decidable is Σ 0 3 -complete and it is is Σ 0 4 -complete to determine whether a cellular automaton is computationally universal. Here universality is to be understood in the sense of Davis [6] and relates to the completeness of the reachability relation in phasespace. Similar problems occur in the evolution of spatially periodic configurations [41] .
Indeed, one can introduce a classification of one-dimensional cellular automata based on the complexity of reachability. To this end, define C d to be the collection of all cellular automata whose Reachability problem on the space C ap has degree exactly d, some semidecidable degree. It is important to note that this condition is significantly stronger than the stipulation that the cellular automaton has to be capable of enumerating some set whose degree is d. The problem is that only a few of the orbits of the cellular automaton will correspond to actual computations of the corresponding Turing machine, but the classification involves all orbits. Some amount of effort is necessary to control the complexity of these other, computationally meaningless orbits, see [42, 43] . At any rate, one can show that for every semidecidable degree d there is a one-dimensional cellular automaton whose Reachability problem has degree precisely d. In fact, the cellular automaton can be chosen to be reversible. Reachability is closely related to Confluence: given two configurations, do their orbits overlap? One might suspect that the complexity of Reachability and Confluence are fairly closely coupled, but nothing could be further from the truth. More precisely, for any two semidecidable degrees d 1 and d 2 , there is a one-dimensional cellular automaton whose Reachability problem has degree d 1 and whose Confluence problem has degree d 2 . Needless to say, the last result cannot hold when one considers only reversible cellular automata: in this case confluence of X and Y is equivalent with X being reachable from Y or Y being reachable from X.
These results show that one should not expect to find any simple hierarchy when one considers the computational universe of all one-dimensional cellular automata. In a sense, the enormously difficult structure of the upper semilattice of the semidecidable degrees carries over to this realm. For example, by Sacks' density theorem, for any two degrees d 1 < d 2 there exists a third in between:
The Entscheidungsproblem for this semi-lattice is highly undecidable, see [17] .
Processes and Observers
We will now indicate why results like the existence of orbits of intermediate degree in phasespace may be misleading if one is narrowly focused on the physical aspects of computation. Since no natural examples of such degrees are known, the proofs of these results are based on the classical arguments from computability theory, carefully translated into the context of orbits on C ap so as to avoid complications arising from unintended orbits. These embedding issues arise whenever we attempt to interpret the dynamics of a physical systems as performing a computation. In fact, Searle [36] points out, "Computational states are not discovered within the physics, they are assigned to the physics." Even in the context of our over-simplified systems the proper interpretation can be quite difficult. For example, while everyone would agree that the orbits generated by elementary cellular automaton number 110 are surprisingly complicated, it requires a highly sophisticated argument to show that one can indeed interpret some of these orbits as performing universal computations. Incidentally, it would be interesting to construct a machine-verifiable proof of this universality assertion; due to size of the building blocks of the configurations required in the argument and the highly non-continuous nature of the system finding such a proof is probably quite challenging. Now suppose we have a one-dimensional cellular automaton, operating over C ap , that implements the construction of a semidecidable set of intermediate degree, based on some particular version of the Friedberg-Muchnik priority construction. One standard version of the construction builds two sets A and B that are mutually incomparable with respect to Turing reductions, and thus by necessity of intermediate degree. It was shown by Soare [39] that the disjoint union of A and B is complete. Thus, an observer monitoring the construction might well conclude that the corresponding process is likewise complete. After all, one has to willfully ignore either A or B to conclude otherwise. This suggests a classification of computational processes based on the ability of on observer to extract complicated observations from the process. More precisely, consider one of our cellular automata operating on C ap . Given some initial configuration X 0 = ω u 0 w 0 v 0 ω we obtain a sequence of configurations X t = ω u t w t v t ω , t ≥ 0, by iterating the global map. We may safely assume that the length of u t and v t remains constant, but, in general, the length of w t increases without bound. Note that the computation is narrowly constrained in this setting; as single step in phasespace cannot encompass a complicated sub-computations such as, say, a whole stage in a priority construction. In fact, even a simple task such as the comparison of two numbers requires multiple steps.
The observer, on the other hand, has the ability to filter out some part of this highly detailed process by scanning current configuration and rewriting it slightly. Since there are only finitely many choices for the periodic parts u t and v t we may as well assume that the observer only sees w t . This leads us to define an observer to be a word function ρ over the alphabet Σ that is computable in constant space. We associate the language O ρ = { ρ(w t ) | n ≥ 0 } with the observer which we refer to as the observation language of ρ. As an immediate consequence of our definitions, any observation language must be semidecidable. Of course, there is always on observer whose observation language is trivial. We are here interested in the case where the observer monitors some part of the process that is computationally interesting, such as the two sets A and B in the standard Friedberg-Muchnik construction above. Since we do not wish for the observer to be able to artificially inflate the complexity of the observation language, it is critical that the observer is strictly constrained in computational power. For example, if we considered a linear bounded automaton, the observer itself could perform a computation not related to the cellular automaton, using the given input w n as scratch space. As long as the length of w t grows without bound, any computation whatsoever could be performed in this fashion.
It is easy to see that one can construct processes and observers that produce an arbitrary semidecidable set S, for example by constructing a substring of w n of the form #1 n # whenever n is recognized to be in S. Here # is a special separator symbol. If we apply this approach to the set of all pairs (e, x) ∈ N × N such that x ∈ W e , we obtain a single processes that admits an observer whose language is an arbitrary semidecidable set W e , for all e.
We can now pin down processes of intermediate complexity as follows. First, we call the process undecidable if there exists an observer whose observation language is undecidable. For example, a process for which w t = 1 How, then, would the construction of a set of intermediate degree fare in this framework? Consider the variant of the Friedberg-Muchnik priority argument that constructs two sets A and B that satisfy the requirements (R 2e ) A = {e} B (R 2e+1 ) B = {e} A for all e ∈ N. Here sets are identified with their characteristic functions so that A = {e} B means that the set A differs from the set computed by the eth partial recursive function with oracle B. In other words, A is not Turing reducible to B via function number e. Certainly, if all requirements are indeed satisfied, then neither set can be used to compute the other one and thus both must have intermediate degree. The principal problem in the construction is that we have to deal with infinitely many requirements, and the individual requirements may well clash with each other. To deal with these issues one orders the requirements into a sequence R 0 < R 1 < R 2 < . . . where lower rank means higher priority. At any stage during the construction, we work only on the requirement of highest priority that currently fails to be satisfied and that can be addressed at this stage. The details are somewhat complicated and require a great deal of care. However, at each level the construction is primitive recursive and a simple induction argument shows that, in the end, all requirements are ultimately satisfied. Clearly there are observers for this process that return either A or B. Alas, there are others that return the disjoint sum of A and B and thus, by Soare's result, a complete set. Similar difficulties arise in all known constructions, see [45, 46] and [34, Chp. 4] or [30, Chp. X] for more details on the corresponding constructions. In fact, it was suggested by Jockusch and Soare in [22] that priority constructions obey a kind of "maximum degree principle" in the sense that the construction of an recursively enumerable set with weak negative requirements automatically produces a complete set. If the requirements are strong enough to prevent completeness of the generated set the construction itself is essentially based on universal computation. This universality is irrelevant in the context of the theory of computation but becomes visible when we recast the argument as a computational process.
It is thus tempting to conjecture that, in the context of some reasonable theory of physics, intermediate processes fail to exist. 
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